Dr Fraser McQueen

 

This post was originally published on The Identities Blog by Identities: Global Studies in Culture and Power. First published 10 July 2024: ‘The hard work begins here: France's legislative elections and what comes next’.

Anxieties were running high on Sunday 7th July as French voters went to the polls in the second round of this year's legislative elections. At a time of rising support for the far right across Europe – and with France's current centrist administration having already passed hard-line anti-Muslim and anti-migrant policies – most observers believed that the far-right National Rally (RN) would emerge as the nation's strongest party. An overall majority seemed unlikely, but possible.
 
The eventual result was very different: a shock victory for the left-wing New Popular Front (NFP). The RN and its allies finished third, with the 'centrist bloc' composed of President Emmanuel Macron's party and its allies coming in second.
 
The far right was kept out through a resuscitation of what was historically labelled a 'Republican front'. As the second round of voting approached, an unprecedentedly high number of three-way contests in various constituencies looked likely. Many (although not all) candidates from either the left or centrist blocs therefore stood down, asking their first-round supporters to support an opponent better placed to beat the RN. 
 

This was despite members of Macron's camp having previously framed the election as a contest between themselves and two ‘extremes’ of the right and left: a framing that treated the two as equally dangerous. Accusations of antisemitism were directed against members of La France Insoumise (LFI), the NFP's largest party, for speaking out against the ongoing genocide in Palestine. Conversely, in other recent run-offs, left-wing leaders have called on their supporters not to vote for the RN, but have not overtly asked that they vote for Macron's party given its reactionary policies on economics, race and immigration.
 
The shift to endorsing a 'Republican front', in both cases, perhaps reflects a recognition that, for the first time, victory for the RN was a genuine possibility. For at least some centrists, this may reflect an implicit recognition that it was always intellectually dishonest to treat the left as 'extreme' (had they really believed this, they would surely have followed through). Leftist leaders seem also to have recognised that, reactionary though Macron's government may be, the RN would still have outflanked them to the right. While Macron's reactionary policies remain in place, with their impact on those at the sharp end unchanged, that recognition remains to the credit of both blocs.
 
That it was the NFP, formed under a month ago, that benefited the most demonstrates a genuine appetite for left-wing politics in France. It shows that the left can win by opposing not only the 'illiberal' racism of the far right, but also that of mainstream liberals. The NFP's programme includes a call for an immediate ceasefire in Gaza and recognition of a Palestinian state, as well as the reversal of Macron's controversial reforms to state pensions and a substantially increased national minimum wage. While there are some disappointing omissions, particularly on the issue of police brutality against non-white people, voters opted not for centrist triangulation but for a programme firmly rooted in left-wing policies.
 
However, certain Anglophone observers have described the result as a triumph for Macron, or a validation of his tactical nous. That analysis is simply incorrect. Macron's alliance entered this election as comfortably the largest parliamentary group; it is now second. He spent the campaign smearing the NFP as 'extremists'; their deputies now outnumber his. Indeed, it can at the very least be credibly argued that the racist and xenophobic measures passed by his party contributed to normalising the RN in the first place.
 
The credit for keeping the far right out lies instead with the left, who unambiguously stated early on that their candidates in three-way contests would stand down in favour of better-placed centrists. It also, surprisingly, seems to lie with Macron's Prime Minister, Gabriel Attal - himself hardly a progressive, being conservative on economics and as Education Minister having banned Muslim schoolgirls from wearing the abaya. Attal set aside his ideological differences with the left, calling on centrist candidates to stand down where necessary to keep far-right candidates out: a strategy that Macron reportedly opposed. Calling a snap election was a wild gamble: the far right lost despite Macron, not because of him.
 
I believe that the left are the bloc best placed to defeat the far right again in future. This election showed that only actively opposing racism, and not normalising it through both policy and rhetoric, can provide voters with a credible alternative. Nonetheless, their task in the coming months will be difficult. Although the NFP is now the nation's biggest bloc, their 180 seats in the National Assembly is far from the 289 required for a majority. Given the bad blood dividing the three electoral blocs, it is hard to see a route to a coalition enabling anyone to control a working majority. Under those circumstances, France could become close to ungovernable. It is important not to exaggerate the scale of the left's victory: given the difficulty they will face in applying their programme, and consequently in generating meaningful improvements to the lives of marginalised people, expectation management will be vital to avoid voter disillusionment.

Equally, the NFP is a coalition of parties that have struggled to work together in the past. A similar alliance was formed prior to the 2022 legislative elections only to quickly collapse afterwards. Cracks have already started appearing since the election, with the parties as yet having been unable to agree on whom they should ask Macron to nominate as Prime Minister. LFI and the Communist Party had agreed to endorse former Communist deputy and president of the regional council of La Réunion, Huguette Bello. However, the Socialist Party (who, perhaps confusingly for Anglophone readers, represent the social democratic element of the alliance) refused to follow suit.

The refusal has led to recriminations within the NFP, with LFI’s national co-ordinator Manuel Bompard accusing the Socialists of ‘blocking everything’. It seems that the Socialists will only agree to endorse their own leader, Olivier Faure. This is not an entirely unreasonable suggestion: given the absence of any clear majority, a figure closer to the centre may be best placed to represent the NFP while also leading a government of national unity. Equally, the Socialists are now roughly level with LFI as the NFP’s largest party, and recently outperformed them in June’s European Elections. Nonetheless, their intransigence hardly bodes well for the NFP’s future – particularly given that 73-year-old Bello, an experienced left politician affiliated with neither the Socialists nor LFI, represented a compromise figure.

The underlying suspicion is that the Socialists may be contemplating an attempt to cobble together a coalition with Macron’s centrists, and perhaps parts of the centre right, abandoning the NFP in the name of ‘national unity’ and the need for stable government. Indeed, allies of Macron started signalling their willingness to consider such a coalition almost immediately after the election. Since, Attal has backtracked on his previous implicit acceptance that voting for the left was a legitimate means of keeping the far right out of power by thundering that he wishes to ‘protect’ the French people from a government including any ministers from either the RN or LFI. In a ‘letter to the French people’, Macron has claimed that ‘no-one won the election’ (not a claim he made in 2022, when his own party won while failing to take a majority), calling on ‘all the political forces that recognise themselves in republican institutions’ to form a coalition.

If the Socialists accepted, marginalising the more left-wing (although, as per France's supreme court, not 'far left') LFI, many voters would doubtless consider it a betrayal. The Socialists had previously split from LFI over the latter party's support for the Palestinian cause. While in government from 2012-2017, they themselves contributed both to mainstreaming racist policy positions and to weakening workers' rights; between 2014 and 2016, Macron himself was Socialist Minister for the Economy. The President at the time, François Hollande, has joined and been elected as a deputy for the NFP. Under those circumstances, there were question marks over the Socialists’ commitment to the NFP’s more radical policy positions even before the disagreement over Bello. There may be reasonable arguments in favour of the NFP asking that Macron name a Socialist, but there are equally good reasons for supporters of the other parties in the coalition not to trust Faure’s party.

Abandoning the platform on which they were voted in would surely be electoral suicide, and those of us on the left must hope the Socialists realise this. Nonetheless, even with them on board it is unclear how the NFP finds a working majority. Whom Macron eventually names as Prime Minister is therefore a key sign to look out for. Will the left reach a consensus over whom to endorse? If they do, will Macron appoint them? Traditionally, the Prime Minister would be a member of the largest party, starting a period of 'cohabitation' between a President and Prime Minister of differing persuasions. Prior to previous periods of cohabitation, however, a party other than that of the President had won an overall majority. This effectively forced the President to appoint one of their members to avoid a no-confidence vote. It would not be out of character for Macron to interpret the left’s lack of an overall majority as validation for him to name some other candidate, perhaps a member of his own party – particularly given that right-wingers have demanded that he refrain from naming a left-wing Prime Minister. Going down this route may on some level be framed as a means to deliver a workable compromise government, able to respond to the desires of a fragmented electorate. Nonetheless, distancing the group that took the most seats from the premiership would not seem to equate to any everyday, intuitive understanding of democracy.

This would be particularly problematic given the continued threat posed by the RN. Despite the understandable relief that they were blocked, with 125 parliamentary seats, they are now France's largest single party. Although they won fewer seats than their rivals, they and their allies received comfortably the most votes. This was the first time in the party's history that it had taken over 100 seats: in 2022 they took 88, and in 2017 only 7. Having spent much of his mandate mainstreaming the party's rhetoric, Macron once again must personally take the blame for much of this.

According to Marine Le Pen, the RN should view the results not as a defeat but a 'postponed victory'. If opponents of her party wish for her to be proven wrong in the presidential election of 2027, the hard work to build an effective government begins now (or more accurately last week). In the meantime, the marginalised populations targeted by the far right must be protected against any potential backlash from its supporters - and once the details of government have been finalised, the left must use whatever leverage it has to fight against the racist policies that have already been a feature of Macron's administration.

Author Biography

Dr Fraser McQueen is a Lecturer in French Studies and Comparative Literature at the University of Bristol, who has previously held positions at the Universities of Stirling and Edinburgh. His research focuses on Islamophobia and community in contemporary France, with particular areas of interest including the French far right, the mainstreaming of far-right conspiracy theories, and the relationship between politics and culture. His first monograph, Towards a Community of Friendship? Contemporary French Islamophobia in Literature and Film, is under contract with Liverpool University Press. He is also co-convener, with Salomé Ietter, of the French Politics and Policy specialist group of the Political Studies Association.